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PATENT EXHAUSTION AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DEVIANT
CONDITIONAL SALE DOCTRINE:
BOWMAN V. MONSANTO
ADAM GARMEZY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Both patent law and antitrust law were created with a similar
1
motive—the maximization of consumer surplus. Yet, these bodies of
law come into direct tension because of the means employed by each.
Whereas antitrust law operates to curtail the evils of anticompetitive
conduct, intellectual property law attempts to incent innovation by
restricting competition and harnessing the benefits of monopolistic
2
pricing. In fact, patent law creates a private right of action, allowing a
3
patent owner to bring suit against anyone who “without authority
4
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.” Although
patent law allows individuals to capture monopolistic profits, these
5
government-endorsed monopolies do not run unchecked. Patents are
6
limited in duration and once the monopoly period has lapsed, the

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2014.
1. See Seungwoo Son, Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship
Between Patent Rights and Antitrust Law, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 110 (discussing
how antitrust law attempts to “foster[] a competitive marketplace” and intellectual property law
“promotes innovation by granting a patent or copyright holder the right to limit competition”);
but see generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978) (arguing that antitrust law should focus on maximizing total surplus as opposed to
preferencing consumer welfare over producer welfare, an idea associated with the Chicago
School tradition of antitrust).
2. Son, supra note 1, at 110.
3. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2013) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”).
4. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2013).
5. See Nicholas Economides & William N. Hebert, Patents and Antitrust: Application to
Adjacent Markets, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 455, 456 (2008) (discussing how patent law
grants “legal monopolies” that are limited in duration).
6. Id. (“Patent rights for most inventions, including [certain] processes or methods . . . ,
last for twenty years from the date of filing.”).
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patented innovation enters the public domain. Moreover, legal
doctrines like patent exhaustion restrict the scope of patent
8
monopolies.
Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, an authorized sale exhausts
9
the patent monopoly, giving the buyer the right to “use it, repair it,
modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions
10
of the sale.” In this way, patent exhaustion works to counterbalance
11
the patentee’s monopoly power and prevent anticompetitive abuse.
The Federal Circuit, however, has developed an opposing doctrine,
the conditional sale doctrine, under which a patentee may use an
enforceable contract to restrict the rights of a buyer using a patented
12
article, even after a subsequent sale. The conditional sale doctrine
could prove particularly important in the arena of self-replicating
technologies. Because self-replicating technologies are capable of
generating multiple, matching copies of the product after an
authorized sale, such technologies create a wrinkle in patent
jurisprudence by allowing consumers to circumvent the
13
manufacturer’s monopoly. Whereas under the exhaustion doctrine
the seller would be left without a remedy to protect his innovation,
under the conditional sale doctrine the seller could prevent the buyer
from replicating his innovation.
Only by achieving the right balance between antitrust law and
intellectual property law will we truly maximize long-term consumer
surplus. The Supreme Court has the opportunity to achieve such a

7. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (explaining that in the “post-expiration
period” the patent enters “the public domain”).
8. Curtis R. Wright, Quanta of Solace?: The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine and Method
Patents After Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Electronics, Inc., 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 494, 500
(2009) (“The purpose of the patent exhaustion doctrine is to act as a counterbalance to
monopoly powers granted to patent owners in order to prevent anticompetitive abuse.”). The
patent exhaustion doctrine is also known as the first sale doctrine. Yee Wah Chin, Inexhaustible:
Patents on Self-Replicating Technologies, 3 LANDSLIDE 12, 13 (2011).
9. John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer's Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of Patent
Exhaustion: An Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
245, 249 (2008).
10. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
11. Wright, supra note 8, at 500.
12. See Mallinckrodft, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding
that if a “device is validly licensed for only a single use, any reuse is unlicensed and an
infringement”).
13. See Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 229, 229
(2013) (commenting that “self-replicating technologies pose a challenge to the legal regimes we
ordinarily rely on to promote a balance between innovation and competition”).
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balance in the upcoming case Bowman v. Monsanto Co., where the
Court may decide whether the patent exhaustion doctrine prevents
patentees from claiming infringement when a purchaser of self15
replicating seeds uses those seeds to plant subsequent generations.
The Supreme Court has yet to endorse the Federal Circuit’s
conditional sale doctrine and it is unlikely to do so in Bowman. Yet,
the Court can still hold for Monsanto and exempt self-replicating
technologies from the patent exhaustion doctrine by treating
subsequent generations of seeds as impermissible reconstructions that
infringe the patent.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At issue in Bowman are two patents owned by Monsanto that
protect Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® soybean seeds, genetically
modified to be resistant to glyphosate herbicides like the commonly
16
used Roundup® product. Monsanto’s 605 patent protects the use of
the cauliflower mosaic virus as a vector for transforming foreign
17
genetic material into plant cells and the 247E patent protects the use
of the cauliflower mosaic virus transformation process to genetically
modify
plants
to
express
glyphosate-tolerant
5–
18
enolpyruvylshikimate–3–phosphate synthases (EPSPS), creating the
glyphosate resistance prized in Monsanto’s Roundup Ready®
19
soybean seeds. Since 1996, Monsanto has licensed producers to sell
20
Roundup Ready® soybean seeds to individual farmers for planting.
Because the glyphosate-resistant seeds are self-replicating, and
succeeding generations express the patented glyphosate-resistant trait
(the ESPS technology trait), Monsanto restricts the purchaser’s use to
21
a single growing season.

14. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013).
15. Although Bowman involves self-replicating seeds, the holding may apply to all selfreplicating technologies, including self-replicating nanotechnologies like DNA innovations.
Supreme Court Case Puts Cutting-Edge Innovation at Stake, INNOVATION AT STAKE (Jan. 17,
2013), http://www.innovationatstake.com/supreme-court-case-puts-cutting-edge-innovation-atstake/.
16. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
420 (2012).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1343–44.
19. Id. at 1344.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1345.
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All individual purchasers are subject to the Monsanto Technology
Agreement, under which each individual purchaser agrees: (1) “to use
the seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a
commercial crop only in a single season”; (2) “to not supply any of this
seed to any other person or entity for planting”; (3) “to not save any
crop produced from this seed for replanting, or supply saved seed to
anyone for replanting”; and (4) “to not use this seed or provide it to
anyone for crop breeding, research generation of herbicide
22
registration data, or seed production.”
Although individuals cannot use second-generation glyphosateresistant seeds for replanting, the Monsanto Technology Agreement
does permit the sale of second-generation seeds to grain elevators for
use as commodity seed—a mixture of undifferentiated seeds
23
harvested from multiple suppliers. Under the Monsanto Technology
Agreement, individuals are not required to place restrictions on the
24
grain elevator’s subsequent resale of the seeds. If Monsanto had
blocked the resale of commodity seed, often purchased by animal
25
feeding operations, Monsanto would have decimated the commodity
soybean market by reducing the available supply by approximately
26
ninety-four percent. The unforeseen result of permitting resale,
however, was that by 2007 ninety-four percent of Indiana’s planted
soybeans exhibited the patented trait and were therefore immune to
27
glyphosate-based herbicide.
Defendant-appellant Bowman purchased Roundup Ready® seeds
from Pioneer Hi–Bred and signed the Pioneer Hi–Bred Technology
Agreement, which presented identical language to the Monsanto

22. Id. at 1344–45 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 1345.
24. Id. (“Monsanto authorizes growers to sell second-generation seed to local grain
elevators as a commodity, without requiring growers to place restrictions on grain elevators’
subsequent sales of that seed.”).
25. See Dennis Crouch, U.S. Government Brief: Farmer Who Purchases Commodity
Soybeans Cannot Replant Those Beans Without Committing Patent Infringement, PATENTLYO
(Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/us-government-brief-farmer-whopurchases-commodity-soybeans-cannot-replant-those-beans-without-committing-patentinfringemen.html (discussing the normal use of commodity seed).
26. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345 (highlighting that ninety-four percent of Indiana’s
planted soybeans exhibited glyphosate resistance).
27. See id. (noting that “[c]ommodity seeds are a mixture of undifferentiated seeds
harvested from various sources, including from farms that grow Roundup Ready® soybeans and
those that do not, although nearly ninety-four percent of Indiana's acres of soybeans planted in
2007 were planted using herbicide resistant varieties”).
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Technology Agreement. Bowman planted glyphosate-resistant seeds
for his first crop in Knox County, Indiana each year from 1999
29
30
through 2007, and never saved any seeds from his first crop.
31
In 1999, Bowman purchased commodity seed for a second crop.
Bowman considered the second crop to be riskier, and consequently
purchased the cheaper commodity seed instead of Pioneer’s Roundup
32
Ready® seed, which is significantly more expensive. To determine
whether his second crop was glyphosate resistant, Bowman applied
33
glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields. Many of the plants
exhibited glyphosate resistance, and unlike with his first crop,
34
Bowman saved the glyphosate-resistant seeds from his second crop.
Bowman used these saved seeds from 2000 to 2007 for his second
35
crop, supplemented with additional seeds from the grain elevator. A
Monsanto-driven investigation concluded that the second-crop seeds
36
contained the patented EPSPS technology. Because the Monsanto
Technology Agreement only applied to seeds purchased from either
Monsanto or a Monsanto-licensed dealer, Bowman’s use of the
commodity seed and its progeny did not strictly fall within the four37
corners of the agreement.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There is widespread debate about the extent to which patent
holders can enforce downstream, post-sale restrictions upon
38
purchasers of the patented product, fueled by seemingly divergent
legal precedent arising from the Supreme Court and the Federal
39
Circuit. Whereas the Federal Circuit has strengthened post-sale
28. Id.
29. See id. (noting that Bowman purchased “seeds containing the Roundup Ready®
technology each year, beginning as early as 1999” and that “Bowman planted Roundup Ready®
seeds as his first-crop in each growing season during the years 1999 through 2007”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1345–46.
34. Id. at 1346.
35. Id.
36. See id. (remarking that in 2007 “Monsanto investigated eight of Bowman's fields,
totaling 299.1 acres, and confirmed that Bowman's second-crop soybean seeds . . . contained the
patented Roundup Ready® technology”).
37. Id.
38. Erin Julia Daida Austin, Note, Reconciling the Patent Exhaustion and Conditional Sale
Doctrines in Light of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2947, 2947–48
(2009).
39. Id. at 2948.
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rights to the patent holder via the conditional sale doctrine, the
41
Supreme Court’s recent holdings have restricted patentee rights.
Recently, the debate has centered on whether the patent exhaustion
doctrine should be applied in the realm of self-replicating
technologies.
A. The Supreme Court’s Early Forays into Patent Law
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution enables
Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right
42
to their respective writings and discoveries.” Congress has since
imposed four requirements for patentability: (1) patentable subject
43
matter, (2) usefulness, (3) novelty, and (4) nonobviousness. Under
44
this rubric, six types of patents have arisen, including utility patents,
which are “[i]ssued for the invention of a new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful
45
improvement thereof.”
46
The doctrine of patent exhaustion has existed for over 150 years.
47
In 1873, the Court applied the doctrine in Adams v. Burke, a case
concerning a patent on coffin-lids. There, the patentee prevented the
original purchaser from using the coffin-lids within a certain
48
location. The Court found that once the coffin-lids had been
49
subsequently sold the use restriction had been exhausted. The Court
noted that, “in the essential nature of things, when the patentee . . .

40. See id. at 2948–49 (discussing the difference between the patent exhaustion and
conditional sale doctrines).
41. Kyle M. Costello, The State of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, Post-Quanta v. LG
Electronics, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 238 n.1 (2010).
42. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS.
L. REV. 1353, 1361 (discussing the “criteria of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness”); id. at
1354 (arguing that the “doctrines on patentable subject matter are difficult to apply”).
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
44. Types
of
Patents,
U.S.
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/patdesc.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013).
45. Id. Method patents fall under the category of utility patents, id., and are patents of “an
act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state of things,” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
46. Brief for Knowledge Ecology International at 2, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796
(U.S. Dec. 10, 2012).
47. 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
48. Id. at 455–56.
49. Id. at 457 (“[W]e hold that in the class of machines or implements we have described,
when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for
the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees.”).
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sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives
the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that
50
use.”
51
Almost seven decades later, in United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
the Court again rejected a patent infringement claim under the patent
52
exhaustion doctrine. There, a patentee sold its patented lens blanks
to a wholesaler who, in order to market the product, was required to
53
first grind the blanks to finish the lenses. Univis implicated antitrust
law as well because the licensed wholesalers were required to sell the
54
finished lenses at a price fixed by the patentee. The Court, applying
the patent exhaustion doctrine, held that the patentee could not
55
dictate the resale price of the completed lenses. It reasoned that
“where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it
embodies essential features of [the] patented invention, is within the
protection of [the] patent, and has destined the article be finished by
56
the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention.”
The Court ruled that exhaustion applied whether the patentee sold
the patented article “in its completed form,” or in an uncompleted
57
form “for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish and sell it.”
B. A Brief History of the Patent Act
In 1952, Congress enacted a comprehensive patent protection
scheme in Title 35 of the United States Code, otherwise known as the
58
Patent Act. Section 271(a) of the Act defines infringement broadly:
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
59
patented invention . . . infringes the patent.” Whereas reconstructing
a patented item violates § 271(a), because it is considered an
50. Id. at 456.
51. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
52. Id. at 250 (“[S]ale of [a patented article] exhausts the monopoly in the article and that
patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the
article.”).
53. Id. at 244.
54. Id. at 245.
55. Id. at 251.
56. Id. at 251–52.
57. Id. at 252.
58. Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). The 1952 Act was by no means Congress’ first
attempt at creating a federal patent system. See e.g., Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790)
(repealed 1793); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). The current Act was amended in
2011, though the subsequent changes are not relevant to this discussion. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (imposing a first-to-file-or-firstto-publicly-disclose system).
59. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2013).
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impermissible making, simply repairing an item does not. Rather
problematically, courts have abandoned attempts to create a clear
framework of rules, instead choosing to rely on a case-by-case
61
approach. Furthermore, patent infringement can occur beyond
America’s borders; under § 271(f), “[w]hoever without authority
supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention . . . in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
62
components” infringes the patent.
Section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Act grants patentees “the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
63
invention.” When a patent is infringed, § 281 of the Act provides the
64
65
patentee with a civil remedy in federal court. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit retains exclusive jurisdiction over federal
66
patent law appeals from the district courts, and has, in recent years,
developed the conditional sale doctrine in an attempt to strengthen
patentee protection.
C. The Federal Circuit and the Conditional Sale Doctrine
The Federal Circuit’s 1992 decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
67
Medipart, Inc. marked the beginning of its campaign to provide more
rights to patent holders by supplementing the traditional patent
exhaustion doctrine with a newly established conditional sale
68
doctrine. In Mallinckrodt, the plaintiff held a patent on a medical
device that delivered therapeutic material to a patient’s lungs in
69
aerosol mist form. The product was packaged and sold to hospitals
60. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the
Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 425–26 (1999) (discussing the
repair-reconstruction dichotomy).
61. See id. at 426 (discussing the application of the repair-reconstruction dichotomy).
62. 35. U.S.C.A. § 271(f)(1) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
63. 35. U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 2013).
64. 35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2013).
65. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (West 2013).
66. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West 2013) (“The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . in any civil action . . . arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”).
67. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
68. See Saami Zain, Quanta Leap or Much Ado About Nothing? An Analysis on the Effect
of Quanta vs. LG Electronics, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 67, 91 (2010) (“In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit directly assailed the first sale doctrine, interpreting
established Supreme Court cases in a manner as to lessen its effectiveness and thereby permit
patentees to control downstream use of articles embodying their inventions.”).
69. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 701.

GARMEZY POST FINAL READ NEW FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 5:23 PM

PATENT EXHAUSTION AND THE CONDITIONAL SALE DOCTRINE

205

70

with a label stating “single use only.” Notwithstanding the single-use
condition, purchasers of the product employed Medipart to
recondition the used devices, allowing hospitals to use the products
71
multiple times. The Federal Circuit held that the single-use
restriction was enforceable, and noted that the condition was
“reasonably within the patent grant” and related to the “subject
72
matter within the scope of the patent claims.” In reaching its
decision, the Federal Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent
holding that “private parties retain the freedom to contract
concerning conditions of sale,” and that such conditions will be valid
73
unless they violate “some other law or policy.”
Strengthening the conditional sale doctrine further, in Jazz Photo
74
Corp. v. International Trade Commission the Federal Circuit
considered the previously unexplored issue of foreign patent
75
exhaustion. There, the patentee owned patents on lens-fitted film
packages used in disposable cameras, and sold the film packages
76
domestically and internationally. After the disposable cameras were
turned in for development abroad, the defendants refurbished and
77
resold them to customers in the United States. Applying the
conditional sale doctrine, the Federal Circuit held that the defendants’
78
actions were “[p]ermissible repair[s],” emphasizing that a purchaser
of a patented article has “the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard
79
it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions of sale.” The court
distinguished between “the patentee’s sole right to make or renew the
entire machine,” and “the right of a purchaser of a patented machine
to replace the machine’s [parts],” finding that the conduct at issue fell
80
into the latter category.

70. Id. at 702.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 708.
73. See id. (interpreting the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion doctrine precedent
narrowly).
74. 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed Cir. 2001).
75. Michele L. Vockrodt, Patent Exhaustion and Foreign First Sales: An Analysis and
Application of the Jazz Photo Decision, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 189, 190 (2005).
76. Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1098.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1110–11.
79. Id. at 1102 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 1103; see id. at 1102 (noting that “the rights of ownership do not include the right
to construct an essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to make the
article remains with the patentee”).
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D. The Supreme Court’s Inclination to Weaken Patent Protection
Despite the broad language in the Patent Act, and in direct
contrast to the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on patentee protection, the
Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted patentee rights, primarily
through maintaining a robust patent exhaustion doctrine. In Microsoft
81
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., AT&T owned a patent for a speech-processing
82
83
method expressed in software code, comparable “to a blueprint.”
AT&T claimed that Microsoft had infringed its patent when
Microsoft’s Windows software, which incorporated the speech
84
processing function, was copied onto other foreign hard drives. The
Court found that the act of selling the software code did not meet 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)’s requirement that a patented invention’s components
85
be sold for combination abroad, “[b]ecause no physical object
originating in the United States was combined with [the foreign]
86
computers.” Although the Federal Circuit had previously only
87
applied § 271(f) to exclusively international conduct, the Court
clarified that § 271(f)(1) does not provide an exception to the general
presumption that “no infringement occurs when a patented product is
88
made and sold in another country.” The Court noted in dictum that a
“machine for making sprockets might be used by a manufacturer to
produce tens of thousands of sprockets an hour,” but this would not
“make the machine a ‘component’ of the tens of thousands of devises
89
in which the sprockets are incorporated.”
In 2008, the Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,
90
Inc. reaffirmed that “[t]he longstanding doctrine of patent
exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item
91
terminates all patent rights to that item.” There, LG Electronics held
92
patents for computer processing methods licensed to Intel. Intel
incorporated LG’s processing methods into microprocessors and
81. 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. at 550.
84. Id. at 442.
85. Id. at 449.
86. Id. at 462.
87. Viki Economides, Note, Tianrui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission: The
Dubious Status of Extraterritoriality and the Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61
AM. U. L. REV. 1235, 1246–47 (2012).
88. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441.
89. Id. at 451.
90. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
91. Id. at 625.
92. Id. at 621–24.
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chipsets, which it subsequently sold to computer manufacturers. One
of the licensing terms stipulated that Intel’s customers could not
combine Intel products containing LG’s patented methods with non94
Intel components. The Court rejected LG’s argument that patent
exhaustion should not apply to method patents, and found that there
95
had been no infringement, because “methods nonetheless may be
96
‘embodied’ in a product, the sale of which exhausts patent rights.”
Quanta chipped away at the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale
doctrine by reaffirming that patents are susceptible to the patent
97
exhaustion doctrine. The Court took a pragmatic approach to
intellectual property protection, wary that otherwise “[p]atentees
seeking to avoid patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent
98
claims to describe a method rather than an apparatus.” In the
interest of maintaining a robust patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court
was unwilling to exempt method patents.
E. Precedent Governing Self-Replicating Biotechnologies
The issue of self-replicating patented seeds that arises in Bowman
is not one that has been thoroughly fleshed out by either the Supreme
Court or the Federal Circuit. Though the Supreme Court has
considered the issue of patented plant seeds, it has not yet issued a
decision addressing the problems posed by self-replicating patented
plant seeds under the patent exhaustion doctrine. In J.E.M. Ag Supply,
99
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., a case concerning hybrid
corn seeds, the Court held that genetically modified plant breeds are
100
patentable subject matter. Thus, a purchaser could not “use a
protected plant variety to produce a hybrid for commercial sale,”
101
because this conduct would infringe the patent. It was unnecessary
for the Court to address the issue of patent exhaustion to dispose of
102
the case.

93. Id. at 623–24.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 630.
96. Id. at 628.
97. Id. (“Eliminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the
exhaustion doctrine.”).
98. Id.
99. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
100. See id. at 130–31 (holding that “living things [are] patentable”).
101. Id. at 143.
102. In fact, nowhere did the Court mention the issue of patent exhaustion.
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The Federal Circuit has also dealt with cases involving the
replication of patented seeds, most notably in Monsanto Co. v.
103
104
Scruggs and Monsanto Co. v. McFarling. In both cases, the court
105
issued favorable rulings to Monsanto, the patentee. In McFarling,
the defendant saved bushels of Monsanto’s patented glyphosateresistant soybean seeds and used them for replanting in subsequent
106
years. The court made three findings: first, that the patent
exhaustion doctrine was not applicable to future generation seeds
where a previous generation had not been sold; second, that the
purchase price of the seeds reflected only the value of the use rights;
and third and most importantly, that the “original sale of the seeds did
107
not confer a license to construct new seeds.” Similarly, in Scruggs,
the defendant purchased Monsanto’s patented glysophate-resistant
cotton seeds, but without first signing the licensing agreement, and
108
then saved seeds to grow in subsequent years. The court observed
that “[t]he fact that a patented technology can replicate itself does not
give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the
109
technology.”
Applying the patent exhaustion doctrine “to
subsequent generations of self-replicating technology would
110
eviscerate the rights of the patent holder.”
IV. RULING BELOW
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana found Bowman liable to Monsanto, and held “that patent
exhaustion [did] not apply to Bowman’s accused second-crop
111
plantings.” The Federal Circuit upheld the ruling in favor of
112
Monsanto on appeal. Judge Richard Linn, writing for the court,
turned to McFarling and Scruggs, two previous Federal Circuit cases
103. 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
104. 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed Cir. 2002).
105. In McFarling, the court declared that “Monsanto had a reasonable likelihood of
success on the issues of infringement and breach of contract, and that it was unlikely that an
antitrust violation would be found.” 302 F.3d at 1299. In Scruggs, the Federal Circuit held that
infringement had occurred and that “Scruggs had no implied license to use Monsanto’s patented
biotechnology.” 459 F.3d at 1336.
106. McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293.
107. Id. at 1299.
108. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333.
109. Id. at 1336.
110. Id.
111. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
420 (2012).
112. Id.
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that grappled with the planting of second-generation, glyphosateresistant seeds, and noted that in both cases “the doctrine of patent
113
exhaustion did not bar the infringement claims.”
Judge Linn, citing Jazz Photo Corporation v. International Trade
Commission, applied the principle that the right to plant the
glyphosate-resistant seeds “d[id] not include the right to construct an
essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to
114
make the article remain[ed] with the patentee.” By spraying his
second crop to create glyphosate-resistant seeds, Bowman constructed
newly-infringing articles. The court rejected Bowman’s argument that
an individual seed “substantially embodies” all future generation
seeds, and that the sale of second-generation seed to grain elevators
115
thus exhausted the patent. Rather, the court found, pursuant to
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., “nothing in the record
indicates that the ‘only reasonable and intended use’ of commodity
116
seeds is for replanting them to create new seeds.” Moreover, the
court pointed out that “[a]pplying the first sale doctrine to subsequent
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights
117
of the patent holder.” The court was concerned with the practical
consequences of inadequate patent protection for self-replicating
technologies and construed patent exhaustion precedent narrowly.
V. ARGUMENTS
Bowman argues for the application of a strict exhaustion doctrine
while Monsanto urges the Court to consider the economic
consequences of applying such a doctrine to self-replicating
technologies. Additionally, Monsanto contends that the exhaustion
doctrine should not apply because Bowman’s infringement occurred
118
in subsequent generations to the initial seeds sold.

113. Id. at 1347.
114. Id. at 1348 (quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 264 F.3d 1094, 1102
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 631 (2008)).
117. Id.
118. Both parties also make statutory interpretation arguments regarding the meaning of
the word “make[]” in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which are not discussed here. The Supreme Court is
unlikely to hold on statutory interpretation grounds alone in light of the pragmatic approach it
has been taking to deciding issues arising under patent law, such as in Quanta.
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A. Arguments for Petitioner, Bowman
Bowman’s arguments rely heavily on older Supreme Court cases
creating a strong patent exhaustion doctrine, and also on its recent
119
decision in Quanta. Bowman argues that selling the seeds to the
grain elevator was an authorized sale that extinguished the patent
120
holder’s rights and that Monsanto did not include language in the
Monsanto Technology Agreement that created a reversionary
121
interest. Once the farmer grows progeny seeds, the farmer is
122
authorized to sell the seeds to grain elevators, and the selling
123
farmers are not required to place any restrictions on these sales. The
Monsanto Technology Agreement also permits grain elevators to sell
124
the patented, progeny seeds as an undifferentiated commodity.
Bowman argues that, analogous to Adams v. Burke, where the
purchaser also intended to use a patented product in a way that the
125
patentee claimed to be unauthorized, the authorized sale to the
126
grain elevator afforded a subsequent purchaser full use rights.
Bowman claims that patent “exhaustion has only one
requirement—an authorized sale,” and that this principle remains true
“even if the sale is to a person who intends to use the patented article
127
in a manner that is not authorized by the patentee.” Because seeds
are self-replicating, successive generations of seeds are embodied in
earlier generations and are therefore protected by the patent.
Pursuant to Quanta, the “sale of a self-replicating product embodying
an invention exhausts patent rights to subsequent generations that are

119. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Dec. 3,
2012) (maintaining that United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) and Adams v.
Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873) support Petitioner’s arguments); Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 250
(“[S]ale of [a patented article] exhausts the monopoly in the article and that patentee may not
thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.”); Adams, 84 U.S.
at 456 (“[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the persons having his rights,
sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its
use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.”).
120. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 14 (“By authorizing the sale of patented
seeds, Monsanto has authorized the sale of a product that can be used for practicing the patents
and therefore has parted with all ability to restrict such use under the patent laws.”).
121. Id. at 30.
122. Id. at 31.
123. Id. at 32.
124. Id.
125. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873) (finding that where a contract
prevented the patent assignee from using the patented coffin-lids within a specific radius, a
subsequent sale exhausted this condition).
126. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 33.
127. Id. at 13.
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128

embodied in the product sold.” Monsanto could have restricted the
ability to sell the second-generation seeds for use as a commodity by
129
simply modifying the Monstanto Technology Agreement.
Bowman highlights the schism in jurisprudence between the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, contending that the Federal
Circuit improperly held in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. that
130
patent exhaustion does not apply to “an expressly conditional sale.”
Bowman argues that Mallinckrodt failed to appreciate that the
Supreme Court has applied patent exhaustion to any and all
131
authorized sales.
Bowman rejects the contention that even if exhaustion did not
132
apply, he would still be liable under the reasoning that, as “the next
generation of seed develops, the grower has created a newly
133
infringing article.” Bowman argues that the planting of the secondgeneration seeds was not a “reconstruction” because a reconstruction
necessitates that patented articles become worn out or broken, and
134
Bowman used the seeds without repairing them.
Finally, Bowman rejects the Federal Circuit’s claim that
“[a]pplying the [patent exhaustion] doctrine to subsequent
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights
of the patent holder,” because patentees can enforce use restrictions
135
through contracts. Bowman contends that the lower court’s ruling
effectively created an exception to the patent exhaustion doctrine. If
Congress thought it appropriate to create an exception for selfreplicating technologies, as it has in other fields, it could legislate on
136
the matter.

128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 22–23.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 420 (2012).
133. Id. at 1348.
134. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 14.
135. Monsanto, 657 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 549 F.3d 1328, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 119, at 52 (noting that Congress passed the Visual
Artists Rights Act, allowing artists to retain attribution rights and prohibit destruction of their
artworks regardless of ownership of economic rights).
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B. Arguments for Respondent, Monsanto
Monsanto makes two primary arguments. First, Monsanto claims
that a conditional sale doctrine is necessary, highlighting the
pragmatic implications of coupling a strict patent exhaustion doctrine
137
with the economic realities underlying self-replicating technologies,
138
particularly the deleterious impact on incentives to innovate.
Second, Monsanto argues that Bowman violated § 271(a) of the
139
Patent Act by creating newly infringing articles.
Monsanto maintains that the “[patent exhaustion] doctrine does
not apply to the new soybeans [that Bowman] made,” because they
140
were neither subjected to sale nor authorized for sale by Monsanto.
Patent exhaustion permits the purchaser to use and resell the
particular article purchased, but the doctrine does not grant the
141
purchaser the right to make new copies of the invention. Monsanto
emphasizes that in past Supreme Court patent exhaustion cases—
including Quanta, United States v. Univis Lens Co., and Adams—the
Court “has never wavered from the principle that patent exhaustion
applies only to the specific article that was sold in an authorized
142
sale.” Because the second-generation seeds were not originally sold
143
to Bowman, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to those seeds.
Accordingly, each soybean produced with the Roundup Ready® trait
144
was a unique infringing article embodying the protected invention.

137. See Brief for Respondents at 45, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Jan. 16,
2013) (arguing that if a farmer is permitted to produce more seeds containing the patented trait,
the “result would be both undesirable and impracticable,” and “in all likelihood, Monsanto
would be unable to bring its invention to market”).
138. Id. at 15.
139. See id. at 14–15 (“[Bowman’s] contention fundamentally misapprehends the doctrine,
which applies only to the specific article sold, not to new articles embodying the patented
invention.”).
140. Id. at 10.
141. See id. at 15 (“Patent exhaustion, where it properly applies, allows the purchaser of an
article embodying an invention to use and resell that particular article—but it does not confer
the right to make, use, or sell the invention generally.”). See also 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West
2013) (defining the contents of a patent and the rights of the patentee, and nowhere conferring
on the purchaser the right to make new copies of a patented invention).
142. Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 15–16.
143. Id. at 3738; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895)
(holding that the owner’s rights to a patented machine are exhausted when a patent owner “has
himself constructed a machine, and sold it without any conditions”); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S.
544, 548 (1872) (holding that patent exhaustion is triggered “where the sale is absolute, and
without any conditions”).
144. Brief for Respondents, supra note 137, at 18.
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Moreover, patentees may furnish certain use rights and not others
145
when commercializing their product. The reproduction of the
Roundup Ready® trait violated the terms of the Monsanto
Technology Agreement, which only provided Bowman with the
146
license to use the patented technology for one growing season. The
price paid by Bowman would be trivial if Bowman could use the
147
Roundup Ready® technology into perpetuity. If any farmer could
reproduce the technology at will, Monsanto would have to charge an
astronomical sum to first-generation users in order to recover
148
research and development costs.
Monsanto contends that holding for Bowman “would be
149
particularly devastating to innovation in biotechnology.” Inventors
would lack incentive to undertake long-term, expensive research
endeavors, because their inventions would not receive sufficient
150
protection against replication. Contractual remedies are insufficient
to provide the proper incentives because it would be impossible, as a
matter of practice, to establish contractual privity with everyone who
151
might misappropriate the protected technology.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should hold for Monsanto and recognize
Monsanto’s patent rights in subsequent generations of the selfreplicating seeds. This will both incentivize investment in
biotechnology by assuring patentees that their innovation will be
adequately protected, and improve efficiency by making it profitable
for patentees to sell their seeds at lower prices. The Court can do so
without eroding the patent exhaustion doctrine by characterizing
Bowman’s opportunistic actions, in spraying his second crop to create
seeds exhibiting glyphosate-resistance, as an impermissible making
under the Patent Act. Moreover, the Court can distinguish this case
from Quanta because the restrictions at issue here are procompetitive.

145. Id. at 37–38.
146. Id. at 34.
147. Id. at 35.
148. See id. at 44–45 (highlighting that farmers have the ability to “create millions of copies
within a few years,” and thus “Monsanto would quickly lose the ability to commercialize its
invention . . . [and] would be unable to bring its invention to market”).
149. Id. at 31.
150. Id. at 31–32.
151. See id. at 51 (claiming that it would be an “impossible task” to contract with all parties
that could potentially infringe on the patent holder’s rights).
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A. Incentivizing Innovation and Increasing Efficiency
Providing the proper incentives for private investment in
biotechnology is especially important because of rapid global
152
153
population growth and increased desertification. The coupling of
increased food demand and decreased arable land is creating a need
for high-yielding agriculture. In 2010, private firms invested $3.5
154
billion for research and development in the seed industry alone.
Seed innovation is beneficial to farmers as well; they experienced a
155
$3.3 billion increase in soybean-related income in 2010. Adequately
protecting patentee rights in seed technology will help ensure that
companies continue to invest in new agricultural innovation and that
farmers have a healthy supply of affordable, high-yielding seed.
Patent protection in the arena of self-replicating seeds is
particularly important. Whereas developing beneficial seed traits is
extremely costly, the patented traits are easily reproduced once
developed because the seed’s progeny contains the desired traits and
can thus be proliferated rapidly. Consequently, if the exhaustion
doctrine applied to self-replicating technologies, a patentee would be
economically compelled to charge an individual farmer the full value
of the invention upfront in order to recoup research, development,
156
and production costs. This financial burden would be nearly
impossible for any individual farmer to bear, and would decimate the
demand for these seeds.
In addition, faithfully applying the exhaustion doctrine would
exacerbate the very anticompetitive effects that the exhaustion
157
doctrine attempts to circumvent.
Under Monsanto’s current

152. See Kenneth R. Weiss, Fertility Rates Fall, but Global Population Explosion Goes on,
L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/population/la-fgpopulation-matters1-20120722-html,0,7213271.htmlstory
(discussing
global,
exponential
population growth).
153. See generally Hari Eswaren et al., Global Desertification Tension Zones, NATURAL
RES. CONSERVATION SERV. (1998), http://soils.usda.gov/use/worldsoils/papers/tensionzonepaper.html (last accessed Feb. 8, 3013) (examining population growth, desertification, and
current agricultural strain); Ha-Lin Zhao et al., Effects of Desertification on Soil and Crop
Growth Properties in Horgin Sandy Cropland of Inner Mongolia, North China, 87 SOIL &
TILLAGE
RESEARCH
175
(2006),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167198705001182 (same).
154. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Seed Trade Association in Support of
Respondents at 17, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2013).
155. Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Bowman v.
Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2013).
156. Id. at 5.
157. See id. (“Such high upfront costs would be problematic for farmers with highly variable
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business model, farmers purchase new seeds every year because they
are prohibited from reusing second-generation seeds. This provides
flexibility, because no individual farmer needs to make a long-term
investment in any single seed variety; rather, farmers have the
freedom to easily change suppliers, increasing avenues for desirable
158
competition.
Monsanto’s current business model improves
efficiency by allowing the second-generation seeds to be used as
commodity seed instead of forcing the seed to go to waste.
B. Construing Bowman’s Actions as an Impermissible Making
Under a faithful construction, the patent exhaustion doctrine
applies exclusively to the seeds purchased directly from Monsanto.
The seeds Bowman used for his second crop were not the same seeds
159
that were purchased via an authorized sale. Additionally, Bowman’s
purposeful spraying of his crop to retain only the herbicide-resistant
seeds was opportunistic, as it was intended to create a fully-resistant
progeny to be used in subsequent years. The Supreme Court can hold
in favor of Monsanto without eroding the patent exhaustion doctrine
by ruling that Bowman’s actions were an impermissible making under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Under the rule articulated in Jazz Photo,
Monsanto can furnish Bowman with the right to use the protected
seeds without conferring the right to “construct” further seeds; when
Bowman sprayed his commodity crop with herbicides with the intent
of creating glysophate-resistant seeds, he impermissibly constructed
160
the patented article.
C. Distinguishing Quanta
Bowman’s reliance on Quanta is misguided. The post-sale
restriction LG Electronics was attempting to use in Quanta restricted

income, requiring long-term borrowing at higher interest rates.”).
158. Id. (noting that high upfront costs would lock farmers into particular seed choices,
stifling competition among seed manufacturers “that occurs as farmers seek out the best new
seed varieties from season to season”). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1950)
(discussing why competition is desirable and claiming that “[t]he heart of our national economic
policy long has been faith in the value of competition”).
159. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 420 (2012).
160. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (discussing the difference between a permissible repair and a prohibited reconstruction);
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (finding that one who purchases a machine “for the
purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of life . . . does not acquire any right to construct
another machine . . . for his own use”).
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competition and was therefore anticompetitive, whereas Monsanto’s
restriction increases the ability for competition in the seed
marketplace and is therefore procompetitive. Moreover, the Quanta
Court explicitly cabined the holding to apply only to “the sale of
components of a patented system that must be combined with
162
additional components in order to practice the patented methods.”
The seeds Bowman used for his second crop did not require
additional components and were not protected by a method patent,
rendering Quanta’s holding inapplicable to the facts in Bowman.
Accordingly, due to the nature of the biotechnology industry as
requiring strong patent protection, the ability to characterize
Bowman’s actions as an impermissible reconstruction, and the factual
differences between Quanta and the case at hand, the Court should
hold for Monsanto.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court likely granted certiorari in this case to
address the Federal Circuit’s deviant strain of precedent, and will use
the case as a canvas on which to diminish the conditional sale
doctrine. By holding that the creation of second-generation seeds was
an impermissible making, the Court will not need to apply the patent
exhaustion doctrine. This will allow the Court to maintain a strong
exhaustion doctrine while still upholding a decision protecting
patentee rights. The Court’s decision in this case will likely have a
significant impact on innovation incentives throughout the entire
biotechnology sector. If the Court holds for Bowman, scientists
attempting to sell specific gene sequences may not be able to
financially recoup their research and development costs; if the genes
they design can simply be replicated and resold, a patentee’s rights to
receive lasting supracompetitive profits will be destroyed. In order to
protect and bolster this important sector in the national economy, the
Court should exempt self-replicating technologies from the
exhaustion doctrine by construing subsequent generations as
reconstructions.

161. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630 (2008) (employing a
practical approach to the patent exhaustion doctrine as applied to method patents). LG
Electronics’ restriction in Quanta prevented the purchaser from combining the patented
product with another non-Intel product. Id. at 624.
162. Id. at 621.

